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Draft Recommendation
on the move towards professional armedforces in Europe
The Assembly,
(i) Noting the rapidly' evolvmg positions of various European countries on compulsory military
sen,ice;
ftr) Considering, in the light of recent crises in Europe. the need for Europeans to have at their dis-
posal light forces ar.arlable at very short notice.
(iit) Noting that the issue of maintaining or abolishing compulsorl' militarl' service is perceived very
differently'by the various European countnes,
(tv) Noting that the move to$'ards professional armed forces is encountering political difficulties in
certain countries, u,hich are concerncd that it might destroy the link betrveen the armv and the nation;
(v) Noting the benefits of compulsorl, military servicc as a social meltrng-pot and source of educa-
tion for young people,
(v) Concerned about the many difficulties involved rn ensunng that military service proves a
worths,hile experience for all young people rn a given age group, and also that there is a strong risk that
some will be treated unfarrly,
(vil) Notrng that economic criteria have a grorving influence on decisions in the field of defence;
(viii) Noting that as a result of the higher cost of professional servicemen, the size of armed forces
rvill decrease considerably if compulsory military service is abolished:
(tO Notrng that a professional army makes for greater flexibilitf in terms of deploymenl. particu-
larly' for operations abroad,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COLINCIL
1. Studl'the comparative costs and specific advantages and disadvantages of armed forces with and
rvithout compulsory military service;
2. Study the impact of abolishing compulsory military semce on the organisation of resen'e forces
and its implicatrons for the collective defence of national temtories.
3. Ask the governments of the 28 WEU nations. regardless of u'hether their countries have compul-
sory militarv sewice, to adopt structures makrng it possible to have avarlable at short notlce a suffictent
number of forces that can be deployed in a multinatronal framework for cnsis management, on the basis
of "convergence criteria" to be drarm up withur WEU.
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Explan atory Memoran dum
(submitted by Mr Davis and Mr Schloten, Rapporteurs)
I. Introduction
l. At the start of the 1990s trvo WEU mem-
ber countries, Luxembourg and the Umted King-
dom, had armed forces consisting solely of vol-
unteers. In 1999 Germany and Greece are the
only WEU members u'hich, for the time being,
have decided to maintarn compulsory militarl,
service as the basis for makrng up their armed
forces. Belgium and the Netherlands have al-
ready gone over to a system of professional
armed forces while France, Italv, Portugal and
Spain are rn the process of doing so and Ger-
many is engaged in deliberations with a view to
deciding whether a model based on conscription,
a mixed system or professional forces is best
suited to its needs. The move tou'ards profes-
sronal armed forces has become virrualll' rnevi-
table and in the medium term this system wrll
become the common denommator for all the
armed forces of the malonty of WEU and EU
member states.
2. For all that, rvhat u'ould appear to be a
simultaneous shrft awav from u'hat used to the
universally follorved practice of compulsory mili-
tary service in favour ofa system ofvoluntcers is
not the result ofanv concerted process but rather
of a change in national perceptions of defence
policies due. on the one hand, to the drfferent
rype of conflict Europe and the rest of the u'orld
have experienced since 1990 and. onthe other, to
the grou,ing pnon{, accorded to economic fac-
tors in developed societies. The Gulf War (Janu-
ary to February 1991) and the media attention ir
attracted helped to imprint on people's mind the
picture of professional Bntish and French sol-
diers carrying out operations on the ground rvhile
the other European NATO and WEU countries
rvere confined to provrdrng air and sea support.
The case for professional armed forces was thus
given a high profile in national pubtic opimon.
3. The quest for a "new world order" and an
increase in the number of "humanitarian" opera-
tions conducted under the auspices ofthe United
Natrons in Afrrca (Somalia. Rwanda, Mozam-
bique), Asia (Cambodia), the Canbbean (Haiti)
and Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina, the For-
mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kos-
ovo) have stretched a'r,arlable human resources.
But recourse to conscripts entails the risk, rn the
event of the loss of human life, of public opiruon
turmng against the idea of European govern-
ments becoming involved in rnternational oper-
ations. At the same time. the end of the cold rvar
created conditions conducive to reduced defence
spending in a chmate in ufuch goverffnents were
inchned to play a less prominent role m the
management of the economy. Added to these two
factors is the "hr-tech effect" rvhich was widelv
publicised during the Gulf \\'ar as a result of the
impact of new technologies used in military op-
erations and uas given prominence again in
NATO's mrlitary arr campaign agarnst the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia (March-June 1999).
4. Similarll'to $'hat has happened in the pri-
vate sector, most WEU member states and other
European countries have dounsrzed their armed
forces in order to make structures more flexible
and the forces themselves more efficient in terms
of all-round capabilrty and force projectron, and
so as to be able to provide them with sophrsti-
cated equipment. The rising cost of such equip-
ment u'eighs heavilv in defence spending as a
rvhole and means choices have to be made to the
detnment of the most ex?osed resource, namely
troops and the facilities assigned to them (bases,
training centres, exercise sites). For this reason,
going over to professional armed forces u'ould
appear to be a logical solution in order to main-
tain a credible defence posture in a tight budget
situation. From the political point of vierv it is
also a popular solution wrth younger-generation
voters, a considerable number of whom view
compulsory military service as a legal obligation
rather than as a dut1, they volunteer to undertake
towards societ_v.
5. The move torvards professional armed
forces will take place dependrng on the national
pnorities of each state, taking account of defence
policy options 
- 
wfuch armed forces for which
missions 
- 
and fundrng availabilitl,. These na-
tional procedures wrll also overlap rvith one an-
other rvhen it comes to forming multinational
units and during humanitanan or peacekeeprng
operations. Cooperation of this sort is increas-
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rngly becoming the rule with unilateral operations
the exception. For planmng purposes this entails
a greater requirement for interoperabilrty, as re-
gards both equipment and also procedures, train-
ing and exercises. Where a countr)' has profes-
sional armed forces, the level of standardisation
rn those areas makes it easier to mount multina-
tional operations in terms of troop unit manage-
ment in the field.
6. Wlule professional armed forces in today's
world are one way of making forces more effec-
tive, they are not the only answer. Armres made
up solely' of volunteers are not the norm in the
majontl' of European countries and some, such
as Germany and Sweden, are looking for half-
way solutions wlth a mixed system of conscnpts
and career soldiers under contract. The cost of a
professional army is not comparable to the cost
of an army of conscnpts and this reduces the
scale of any savings that can be made rn the short
term. There are also other factors to be consid-
ered when assessing the various implications of
professional armed forces, such as recruitment
problems 
- 
wrth which the United States and the
United Kingdom for rnstance are having to con-
tend 
- 
the contnbutions to be made by rvomen
and (in terms of culture or religion) "ethnic" mi-
norities. changes in the demographic pyramid
over the next 15 to 20 years and enhancement of
the role of resen'es as a link betw'een the armed
forces and society in general.
II. Reform ond the move towards
professional armed forces in Europe
7. The end ofthe cold rvar, the lessons learnt
in the Gulf war and the growing number of op-
erations conducted on behalf of the United Na-
trons all set most WEU, EU and NATO member
states thinking about the missions of their armed
forces and the means available to them. The dis-
appearance of the threat of a "world" war in
Europe resulted almost immediately in the reduc-
tion of national military assets within the frame-
work of the CFE and CFEI-A treaties signed at
the start of this decade. The Gulf crisis and rnter-
vention abroad put the spothght on projection
capabilities and the need for forces to be deploy-
able in sufficiently large numbers and equipped
rvith sophisticated weapons. Strategic mobilit-v
(transport), the logistics component (reception
facilities and support over long distances), the
acquisition of intelligence data 
- 
in particular by
observation satellites 
- 
and its processing and,
rncreasingll', computerised battlefield manage-
ment have accordrngly become a top priority in
defimng new national defence systems.
8. Each country has reacted individualll', de-
pendurg on its pnorities and capabilities, in order
to adapt to these new situations. The idea ofpro-
fessional armed forces gained currency rapidly
(in Belgium and the Netherlands), more gradually
(in France, Italy, Porhrgal and Spat") and has
been set as an objective in the Russian Feder-
ation. At the same time most of the European
countries that have chosen not to take up this
option have embarked on a thorough reform of
their defence systems wrth a view eventually to
amvrng at the same result: a more compact, flex-
ible and all-purpose defence posture some of
whose components could, if necessary, be de-
ployed outside national borders. ln countries
which already have professional armed forces,
such as Belgium and the Netherlands (srnce
1997) and the Umted Krngdom, the reforms un-
der way are also designed to make more effective
use of manpower and improve management.
9. The vanous approaches taken by different
countries may lr trme result in convergence of
procedures, training and equlpment. This, coupled
rvith the formation of multinational units and
action in the framework ofjoint operations led by
NATO, WEU and, in due course, the European
Union could produce the nucleus for a real Euro-
pean army in the service of a common foreign
and defence policy. The almost continuous re-
duction in the number of personnel, ageing pop-
ulations and the rising cost of military equipment
- 
above all in strategic areas such as observation
satellites and transport by land, air and sea -
make cooperation and the pooling of resources a
foregone conclusion in the light of what has been
said above.
1. The situation regarding
professional armed forces in Europe
10. The move to an all-volunteer system rn-
volves a radical reform of armed forces, with
major implications for national foreign and de-
fence policies. ln the countnes that have em-
barked on this course, the main objective is force
projection. The shift in emphasis this entails from
a territorial defence posture to one of intervention
abroad is not always easy to reconctle uith the
need to defend national temtonal integrity. This
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srtuation is not nerv to Belgium and France uhich
until recently had an active military presence in
Africa, but rn countries with no such experience
it requires a review of defence doctnnes. The
arrangements made for IFOR and SFOR in Bos-
nia and Herzegovrna and for KFOR rn Kosovo
enabled the governments and military staff of a
large number of European countries to test their
abihq' to manage intervention abroad by their
armed forces in situations w'here national rnter-
ests rvere not under direct threat.
I 1. An all-volunteer system for armed forces
also has domestic, economic and social reper-
cussions whose effects are not felt immediatel1..
As a professional soldier is more expensivel than
a conscript, it is not possible to maintarn such
large forces. Some parts of a force's infrastruc-
ture (such as bases, trarning zones and depots)
therefore become redundant and thrs has conse-
quences at local level, for example rvhen it comes
to;obs. Within the armed forces the disappear-
ance of conscnpts also has an impact on ad-
ministrative, supplies and logistics posts in that
recourse has to be had to outside subcontractors
paid at market rates and, in the event of conflict,
to reservists. The issue oftroop reserves is there-
fore tied up *ith the nhole process of the move
to professional armed forces.
12. However, notwrthstanding the favourable
publicrty it has received, the shift arvay from
compulsorv conscnption to voluntary recruitrnent
is not a course ofaction that has been adopted by
the majonty of European countries. For histon-
cal, economic and social reasons or because de-
fence is no longer given the pnoriq, it had during
the cold war, many countries are reforming their
armed forces by mixrng professionals rvith con-
scripts. Specialised units geared to operations
abroad are being created or strengthened but the
rationale of compulsory military service is still
the norm for recruitment purposes. The cost of
contracts for volunteers and marntarntng a mix of
professionals and conscripts u,ithin a tight budget
does not allow for an increase in the number of
such units and this limits the cases in uhich
troops can be sent abroad to take part in opera-
tions outsrde national borders.
1 The cost includes salary, training, equipment and
material benefits (accommodation, health insurance,
various bonuses).
13. Professional armed forces too are in the
throes of reforms intended to make them more
effective. In most cases such reforms are moti-
vated by a concern to make savings at all levels
n'here these affect defence budgets. The nsing
cost of equipment is a significant factor rvhere
budgetary choices are concerned and has to be
offset by makrng staff cuts and adopting a new
management approach. The second objective of
such reforms is to adapt defence requirements to
changes in societS. b1. trying to persuade ],oung
graduates, including \vomen, to join the armed
forces. This is done by means of recruitment
campaigns and special attention is often paid, as
is the case in the Umted Kingdom at present, to
ethnic minorities.
(a) Spain
14. Since 1991 Spain has had a mixed system
of conscripts and volunteers, the longer-term ob-
jective being to arrive at w'holly professional
armed forces. The law on the "Arrangements gov-
erning armed forces personnel" adopted by the
Chamber of Deputies on l8 February 1999 de-
fines the priorities and objectives ofthe reform of
Spain's armed forces to be completed by the end
of2002.
15. In its preamble the law states that ''the
changeover to a svstem of professional armed
forces rvith a vierv to them becoming more op-
erational, more flexible, fewer rn number and
better equipped, represents a major and historic
challenge because the objective berng pursued is
not merely for them to consist of professional
soldiers and sailors but is more ambitious in that
it aims in particular to constitute ne\\- profes-
sional armed forces". Under Title III of the law,
Article 19 sets the complement of Sparn's armed
forces betw'een i50 000 and 170 000 troops in-
cludrng some 102 000 to 120 000 soldiers and
48 000 officers and NCOs. Military careers are
open to women rvithout restnction rvith the law
defimng professionals as "Spaniards in the armed
forces exercismg professional service"?. Reserv-
ists are divided into three categones3 : temporan.,
volunteer and conscript.
16. The current mixed system will continue
until 2003 but problems have ansen rvith the re-
cruitment of volunteers. For example, 12 583
2 Title i. Afiicle 2.1.t Title XII, Chapter I, Article 162
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candidates applied for the 5 800 vacancies avail-
able in January 1999, but thel'were spread un-
equally over the three services: there was an av-
erage of 16 applications per vacanc)'for the air
force. three for the naq' and only tu'o for the
army't. Women's applications accounted for 20o/o.
An article in the newspaper El Parc quotes a
Ministry of Defence spokesman as saying that
three rs the mrumum number of candidates per
post necessar,'to ensure a sufficient recruitment
rate. Although this example does not matter verl'
much in the current mixed system, if it rvere to
recur it could lead to delays in implementing the
process of going over to professional armed
forces.
(b) France
17. The move to professional armed forces in
France is nothing other than a "cultural revolu-
tion". not so much rn terms of military doctrtne
but in the way it affects the role pla;"ed by com-
pulsory military service in French society' x'here
it is seen as one of the bases of the Republic.
There have ahvays been professionals in the
French military', serving for example in the regt-
ments of the Foreign Legion or in a number of
specialist units made up mainll' of volunteers
under contract. Horvever, the Gulf rvar and above
all the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. together with operations in Africa ot'er
the last ten years have sho*n the limits - in
terms of human resowces 
- 
of a system based on
compulsorl' military service.
18. The close cooperation that developed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina betlveen French forces
and therr British counterparts made up uholly of
professionals also created an atmosphere condu-
cive to the gradual move tou'ards professional
armed forces in France. The decision to that end
taken b1'the French President. Jacques Chirac. in
1996 u'as enshrined in a larv passed on 28 Octo-
ber 1997 stipulating that conscription u'ould end
in 2002. In order to take on board pohtical op-
position to tlus move' and the concerns expressed
about maintalnlng the link between the army' and
the nation, the svstem that has been established
comprises three stages: short courses for young
o El Pa,s,12 Februarv 1999.
' The French Senate had prevented the larv from
being passed on 16 October.
people on defence arrangementsu, mrlitarl' service
and armed forces volunteers:. Militarv service is
due to end on 31 December 2002 and since
1 January 1999 a census of young women has
been under wa1' with a view to their attending the
short courses on defence arargements. Contracts
for career soldiers are being concluded for a pe-
riod of 12 months and are reneu'able arurually for
a total duratron of five years.
19. The objective is to amve at a total com-
plement of 330 000 professionals bv 2002-2003,
supported bv 100 000 reservists. A larv on re-
serves is currently being draun up and should be
passed dunng 1999. This ambitious project, re-
quinng ongolng budget supportS, is armed at
providing France rvith the military means com-
mensurate rvith the role it mtends to play rn
Europe and the u,ider rvorld. According to Major
General Bame, Depu[' Chief-of-Staff in the
Arm\"s "Organisation and Human Resources"
department, the objective is to be able to "sim-
ultaneously deplo1' 30 000 troops to a theatre of
operation for one year urth partial relief opera-
tions, and a 5 OO0-strong force that could be re-
lieved, or to deplol, 50 000 troops to take part in
a major operation"e. Where necessan'these forces
rvi1l be backed up by a "first reserve" of 30 000
troops half of u'hom rn'ill be officers and NCOs.
(c) Italy
20. After envisaging the possibilitl' of keeping
a mxed svstem, Ital1, has also opted to change
over to an all-volunteer system. Developments rn
the European geostrategic environment. greater
participation in United Nations peacekeeping
operations and, above a1l, the fact that Italy is
directly, exposed to the conflicts in the Balkans
have led the Italian authorities to adopt a White
Paper on Defence advocatmg a majonty of pro-
fessionals in its armed forces ghich should have
good mobrlrt_v and equipment suitable for con-
u These consist of one-daf information and assess-
ment courses for 1'oung people oYer 18, involving
r.arious tests. Certificates of attendance are issued at
the end ofthe course.t Article I of larv No. 97-1019 of 28 October 7997
on the reform of national sen'ice.
8 Expenditure on personnel accounts for 13.60/o of
the total defence budget for 1999.
e Scnate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and
the Armed Forces. 3 March 1999. The figures quot-
ed refer solel)'to the armr'.
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ductrng a wide range of mrssionslo and which can
be urtegrated rn multinational mrlitary structures
in the frameq'ork of NATO and WEU. Under
this project. rvhich should be completed b1,2005,
the total strength of the army w.ill be some
140 000 troopsrl. Operational forces will be di-
uded into three categories: deployable troops,
reaction forces and forces for temtonal defence.
21. Volunteers are recruited either for renen'
able periods of three years (short-term volun-
teers) or five years (permanent volunteers). The
current plan continues to give importance to
compulsory militarv service since it is estimated
that there will be 60 000 conscripts in 200512.
Alongside thus mixed system in which profes-
sional armed forces are assrgned mainly to action
abroad while conscripts take charge of territonal
defence, there is also a major programme to re-
structure forces commands and equipment with
special emphasis on deployment means. Nonethe-
less, the idea of all-volunteer forces is begrnning
to take root and will lead to a radical overhaul of
the arrangements set out in the White Paper on
Defence for 2000.
22. This explains w'hy on 8 March 1999 the
Italian Chamber of Deputies debated three mo-
tions and a resolutron u,hose purpose was clearly
to abolish compulsory nirlitary service. After
describrng the changes that have taken place in
the European security landscape, the reforms
under rvaf in other allied countries rvith a vierv to
moving to all-volunteer forces and the need for
armed forces capable of plal,rng a sigruficant
part rn operations abroad, the motions request the
Government to submit:
(lrrttun two months of their adoption) a re-
port "setting out practical arrangements
for the urgent abolition of compulsory
mrlitary service accompanied by a restruc-
turing of Italy's armed forces based on a
system of volunteers uho rvill be profes-
sionals, with the cost to be covered marnlv
10 Including operations to maintain public order,
drarving on lessons learnt from the l-espri Stciltant,
Rtace and Partenope campaigns to fight organised
crime in a number of Italian regions.
'1 The current number oftroops is about 185 000.
" In 1998 there were I 13 000 conscripts.
by the sale of properr-v that the Ministry of
Defence no longer uses or needs ..."13;
(within three months) "a plan for the re-
structuring and reorganisation of the arm-
ed forces (...) seming the length of military
service at six months as from next year.
For the interim penod the plan should en-
visage two options: confirmation of the
mrxed system or choice of the system of
professionals only (...)la;
(within three months) "a report makrng
provision for:
(a) a thorough change in the armed
forces s)'stem accompanied by the
abolition of compulsorv mrlitary
service and the recruitment of the
requisite number of volunteers;
(b) a reduction ur the number of
military means, to be camed out
rvith a vieu'to rmprovrng their qual-
rO,and modermsing them and takrng
due account of budgetary con-
strarnts (...)1s.
23. The resolutron'u requests the Government
to submit wrthin 30 day,s a report ''setting out
practical arrangements for the urgent abolition of
compulsorv military service, accompanied by a
restructunng of Italy's armed forces based on a
system of volunteers who u'ill be professionals,
with the cost to be covered mainly by the sale of
properl_v that the Ministry of Defence no longer
uses or needs...". ln hrs reply to the terls submit-
ted by the parliamentarians, the Deputy State
Secretary for Defence, Mr Giovanni fuvera,
stressed that:
''( .) The purpose of the defence model
u,hich has been under studv for the past
ferv years is to make provision for an op-
erational force wrth ferver troops but able
to react more rapidly and above all cap-
able of takrng action outside Italian terri-
tory in peacekeeping missions and opera-
tions to maintain stabilrty throughout the
rvorld. This model, as currently defined,
proposes a mired svstem, that is one con-
i3 Motion l-00339. 14 January 1999.
1a Morion 1-00352, 2 March isgg.
15 Motion 1-00356, 4 March 1999.
16 Resolution 6-00075, 8 March 1999.
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sisting of both volunteers and conscripts
wrth a clear tendency to an increase in the
voluntary component.
Horvever, rn view of recent intemational
events, the Ministry of Defence is con-
vinced that the trme has come for Italy too
to begrn the changeover from a mixed
system to an all-volunteer and professional
system for military service.
The reasons underlyrng this decision are
mainly operational and strategic: at the
present time an operational capabiliq' de-
pends above all on mobility, speed of ac-
tion, professionalism, the human factor
and the qualrt_v of training and equipment.
However, as we knol, information con-
cerning the phenomenon of conscription
shorvs that it will be difficult in the me-
dium term to continue with the current
mrxed system. Demographic trends, the
growing percentage of conscientious ob-
jectors and the job constrarnts that result
from regronalised compulsory mrlrtary
service suffice to show that it n'ill be ex-
tremely nsky in the medrum term to rely
on conscriptron in order to meet opera-
tional needs (...)'".
24. Mr Rrvera also said the Govemment was
drawing up a draft law that rvas to specifr
"among other things the time-frame and practical
arrangements for the whole process of the
changeover from compulsory military service to
a voluntary system as well as arrangements for
the transition from one to the other in order to
guarantee ... the effectiveness and operational
capabilrty of the armed forces". On27 Septem-
ber, the Chamber of Deputies adopted a law on
women's military service allorning women to
serve in the armed forces for the first time.
(d) Portugal
25. Towards the end of the 1980s, Porrugal
embarked on a radical reform of its armed forces
and in 1992 brought in a mrxed system of con-
scripts, volunteers and career soldiers under
contract. The iength of compulsory military ser-
vice was reduced to four months. This reform,
wfuch was logically supposed to lead to all-vol-
1' Italian Chamber of Deputies offrcial report of the
proceedings ofsitting 499, pages 26-27.
unteil forces in time, did not result in the hoped-
for improvements as regards personnel manage-
ment and overall efficrurcy in the armed forcesl8:
the operational units had to supplement
their ranks with conscripts orvrng to an
insufficient number of volunteers;
a lack of appropriate infrastructure and
training facilrties made it drfficult to
cope simultaneously wrth conscripts,
volunteers and professionals under con-
tract.
the short duration of military service
restricted the overall effectiveness of
the forces system;
the cost of the volunteer system, con-
tracts and compulsory military service
rncreased the share of the defence
budget allocated to personnel;
- 
there was a drop in the general level of
preparation and trarmng.
26. The lessons drawn from this first experi-
ence led the Porhrguese Govemment to decide to
change over to a single system of professional
armed forces by 2003. Over the period 1989-98
numbers in the Porhrguese armed forces went
down by 36%o from 72 000 to 46 000 men and
women uith the number of women set to drop
even further over the next few years". Officers
and NCOs account for about 48%, this rate be-
ing the norm rn professional systems. As in to
other countries wtuch have embarked on simrlar
reforms, it is the army which is expenencrng the
greatest drfficulq in meeting its recruitnent tar-
gets, with only 38% of volunteers and soldiers
under contract.
27. On 5 November 1998, the Government
tabled a draft law on mrlitary service with a view
to fully professional armed forces2o. There are a
number of references in the preamble to the re-
forms under way in other European countries and
the draft law sets three marn objectiveszl:
" White Paper on the move to professional armed
forces, Ministry of Defence, 2 April i998.
" By 2003 the Poruguese armed forces should
number some 40 000.
20 Draft law No. 2L4NII,5 November 1998.
" Ibid.
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a reduction in troop numbers accom-
panied by greater flexibilrty' and mobil-
rty;
reform of reserve troops w'hose num-
bers are to be reduced and rvho are to
be more available;
streamlining of recruitment structures.
28. The draft law proposes the rntroduction of
a system of contracts rvith a minimum duration
of trvo 1,ears and a maximum of nine years with
the possibilrt-v of longer contracts (20 years) for
highJevel techrucal posts. Compulsorl, military
service u.rll not be abolished and provision is
made for it to be re-introduced in a crisis. Tlus is
made clear in Article 1.2 of the draft larv u'luch
states that: "ln peacetime mrlrtary sewice shall
be based on a voluntary system" and in Section
III concerning arrangements for recrurtment in
"exceptional" circumstances. Voluntary militarl'
service is also open to women but the scope of
the tert suggests it is limited?'. The draft law, on
uhich there is a broad consensus among the pol-
itical authorities and civil society in Portugal,
rvas brought before parliament for the first time
in March this lear and is due to be passed during
the second halfofthe year.
(e) Countries opting for a m*ed system
29. Gorng over to a system of professional
armed forces is the choice of countnes which
aspire to a more active role in operations abroad
and which lie in a stable geographic region. in
the present day, the fear of a r,rolation of territo-
nal rntegnq' is fairly' limited and, indeed, does
not exist as far as a certain number of states is
concerned. Smaller numbers of armed forces, the
move to a professional system and the preference
for mobilrty and deployrnent compared with a
static defence posture are the options best suited
to this situation.
30. For other countries, uhich feel more ex-
posed to external threats, marntaining large num-
bers of armed forces in which as many citizens as
possible do military service, continues to be the
basic model supplemented by a partly profes-
:2 According to Article 31, rvomen may volunteer for
mrlitary service in accordance with constitutional
principles concerning the equality ofcitizens and the
social function of motherhood, and uking account of
the specific nature of military dutres.
sional system rn order to facilitate participation
in multrnational operations in the service of the
United Nations or on behalf of NATO. Domestic
poiicy considerations, a desire to preserve the ad-
vantages compulsory mrlitary service represents
by rnvolving citizens (the idea of disciphne and
training to serve one's country) and defence
spending critena steer choices towards mrxed
systems. This is the case in Germany, Frrland
and Poland, to mention a few examples.
(i) Germany
31. Germany has not 1'et decided which rype
of armed forces best meets its defence require-
ments. Domestic as well as economic and foreign
policy considerations make the decision-making
process at nationai level highly complex. The
German armed forces have strong roots in civil
society and their activities are subject to demo-
cratic scrutrnl, by a Parliamentary Commrssioner
for the Armed Forces, a post that was created in
1957 in order to "monitor adherence to the pnn-
crples of urternal command (innere Fiihnmg!3)
and observance of soldiers' rightszo".
32. The situation of the German armed forces
during the cold war was more straightforward.
As a frontline state Germany needed a large army
- 
wrth heaq' equipment and a marked defensive
posture 
- 
for territorial defence. The Gulf war
brought home the fact that this model was not
suited to the deployment of forces outside the
NATO area. The conflict rn former Yugoslavia,
rvith its drrect impact on Germany in the form of
a massive influx of refugees, prompted the politi-
cal and military authonties to adopt a more ac-
tive, preventive posture with regard to cnses.
33. This stance met with political reservations
from not onlv the opposition but also majority
parties, and the German Constitutional Court had
to be called in to settle the debate. ln its judgment
of 12 Jul1, 1994, the Court ruled that the
engagement of German troops abroad in the
framework of a collective security system (NATO
or WEU, for example) and under a Unrted Na-
tions mandate was in accordance rvith Germanv's
Basic Law (or Constitution), provided that it u'as
approved by the Bundestag. That date marked a
radical change in Germany's approach to secu-
23 A concept based on notions of a code of conduct,
rules of command and militarv ethics.
2o 
wrru'.bundeswehr. de.
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rity problems in Europe, one confirmed bv its
deployment of forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Albania and Kosovo.
34. The Government then set about tackling
the delicate. issue of reforming Germany's armed
forces, and proposed three categories of forces :
'the mobilisation-dependent Main De-
fence Forces (MDF) conttnue to be the
backbone of national and Alliance de-
fence,
- 
the readill' operational Reaction Forces
(RF) 
- 
approximately 50 000 strong 
-
constitute, first of all, the active com-
ponent of national defence designed to
protect the mobilisation and deploy-
ment of the Main Defence Forces. Sec-
ondly', they Ne Germany's readily
avarlable contribution to NATO and
WEU operations, should a contingency
demand such a contnbution. Finally,
they are the pool of forces from which
numerically limited German contin-
gents can be made available for certain
UN-led missions;
the Basic Military Organisation is the
basis *rat supports trairung activities
and the day-to-day operation of the
n .{rr
IOTCeS--
35. The total peacetime strength of forces has
been set a1340 000, wlth the possibilrty of in-
creasing to 680 000 in wartime:
233 400 servicemen for the army;
77 400 servicemen for the air force,
2'7 200 sewicemen for the na'r,y.
36. Of those, 200 000 are "regulars and tem-
porary-career volunteers" and 135 000 con-
scripts. Women may serve as volunteers (cur-
rently some 3 500) in the medical service or
military music service. The armed forces con-
tinue to employ a large number of civilians
(143 588 as at 31 December 1998). The reaction
forces (RF) are composed of 37 000 army and
12 300 airforce serviceme#6 who are "volunteer
conscripts, short-semce and career personnel".
2s 
*.llrry.bundeswehr. de/sicherheitspolitik/grundlagen
/security-poliryfl II-3. htm
'u Jorr's Defence II'eekly,7 July 1999, page 24.
37. Like other European countries in the same
situation, Germany is frrding it hard to meet
these targets and follouing a Defence Mrnistry
repor[ in April 1999, the Government decided to
set up a commission on the future of the Bunde-
su,ehr. According to tlus report, cited in Jane's
Defence Weekly'.
"( ) the variety of tasks being performed.
both in Germany and abroad, has stretched
the resources of our armed forces to the
maximum, and ttus increasrngly affects
their structure.
The main causes of this development are
the limited size and composition of our re-
action forces, the grorving shortage of per-
sonnel in the officer co{ps, the shortage of
materiel and the inadequate provision of
funds for the defence budget2?".
38. This commission, established on 3 Ma1'
under the chairmanship of former German Presi-
dent Rrchard von Weizsiicker, is to submit its
findings in 2000. For the immedrate future the
Government has undertaken to increase the
strength of the reaction forces to 63 000. The
pnnciple of conscription (10 months) has not
been challenged, but the emphasis rvill be on re-
crurting volunteers or on the possibility' of con-
tracts allorvtng conscripts to serve beyond the
allotted period of military service. The mixed
system may nevertheless become difficult to
manage in the present budgetary circumstantces,
with regular budget cuts planned until 200328
(the share earmarked for personnel expenditure
berng due to remain at around 50o62e). Matenel
expenditure, most of which relates to the intro-
duction of the Eurofightefo, will probably oblige
the Bundeswehr to drastically revise its human
resources policy, which could lead to a reduction
in ils overall strength and to an hcrease in the
relative share of professional forces.
2' Ibrd.
t* A budget of DM 45 333 million, i.e. about 2o/o of
GDP, is planned for the year 2000.
'n NATO: implications of European integration for
Alhes' defence spending, United States General Ac-
counting Offrce, June 1999, page39
30 About 30oh of the 1999 budget for combat mat-
eriel, rvith no delivery being scheduled before 2000.
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(ii) Finland
39. ln a report the Finnish Council of State
submrued to Parliament on 17 March 1997, en-
titled "European secunty and Finnish defence",
armed forces policy is descnbed as follows:
"The central principle in the Finnish de-
fence solution is territorial defence. It in-
volves an extensive surface area and nu-
mencally strong units being used to tie
down the opponents and force them into
decisive battles in the areas rvhere it is
most advantageous to use our own forces.
The areas of greatest strategic importance
ur the context of the nation as a whole will
be held ur all circumstances. Such a de-
fence system, which does not identify
threats from any particular direction, re-
mains suitable for a country like Finland.
It lacks a strategic offensive capabilitv and
supports u'ell the secunty policy pursued
by Finland. However. the pattern of the
rvar of the future, development of tech-
nologies and changes in society presup-
pose a further development of our defence
doctrine.
Territorial defence can be implemented
only,wrth the relatively strong field army
that general conscription provides. Con-
scription is a natural solution for countries
that primanly take care of their own terri-
tory's defence. General conscription is
also the only arrangement that enables
peacetrme preparedness to be kept rela-
tivelv low and yet provides the possibilrty
of multiplyrng the strength of the defence
forces tenfold rn a short time. Thus a sub-
stantial capaciq,to repel an attack is ob-
tained rvith little expenditure of economic
resources. General conscription also ex-
presses the nation's commitment to de-
fendrng its rndependence"3'.
40. Since 1996, Finland has also developed a
voluntary national defence s),stem whose objec-
tives are to "strengthen the'*ill to defend the na-
tion, to further Finland's defence capabiliq,and
to enhance the capacitl, of public authorities to
deal uith exceptional circumstances (such as
" European Securiq'and Finnish Defence; Report by
the Council of State to Parliament on 17 March
1 997; n"nrv.vn fr,/vn/englishlpttbTicatJ 9703 17se.htm.
crises and national emergencies) ( ) The col-
laboration between voluntary defence associa-
tions and the Defence Forces urthin the ( ) Na-
tional Defence Trainrng Association provides the
right framervork for ensunng a valuable contri-
bution to voluntary defence work (... )"3:.
41. The document also brings to light a prob-
lem shared by all countnes u'hich are restructur-
ing their armed forces on the basis of a mixed or
wholly professional system, namely, how to ac-
commodate real requirements taking account of
defence spending constraints :
"So far, the Defence Forces have been
able to adjust their operations to the level
dictated by cuts. Horvever, falling appro-
pnations over a penod of several succes-
sive years is begrnmng to affect defence
structures. Economies have been made by
consuming stockpiles and lou.enng the
level of maintenance of real estate and
material. Thus, necessary procurements
and refurbishment have been postponed.
The decline in operational funds has re-
duced opporrunities to provide reservists,
conscripts and regular personnel rvith
traimng that rs broad in diversiw and
closely relevant to practical needs. In par-
ticular, field exercises have had to be re-
duced. Provision of new traimng material
and clothing and protective gear for con-
scnpts has likewise slowed down. In 1991
there were 340 000 days of refresher
courses. That total has declined to an av-
erage of 185 000 in recent years. The total
number of reservists wrthout refresher
trarning is nearly 100 000, wluch substan-
tially'lou'ers the field army's level of train-
rng level. Reservists are losrng their "feel"
for u'artime tasks.
Compromise has had to be made with re-
spect to the standard of surveillance of our
sea areas and air space. The economies
have not endangered Finland's territonal
integritl', because military activities in our
environs have been on a lorv level in recent
years. A problem beseurng the Nav_v and
the Air Force is a lowenng of the standard
32 Voluntary defence rvork aims; Finnish Ministry of
Defence; uuv.vn.fin /plm./evmn. htm.
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of persornel training as practical opera-
tions are reduced. It wrll be important over
the next few years to secure the foundation
of the defence system by bringrng the De-
fence Forces' operational expenditure into
line wrth the real need"33.
42. The Government is proposing a plan to
restructure the armed forces and the defence pos-
ture over a ten-year period (1998-2008) based on
the following considerations :
"The main emphasis in the development of
defence in the planning period 1998-2008
will be on ground forces. The preventive
capability of the Defence Forces and their
capacity to react will be improved by
creating readiness brigades in ttre military
commands as well as by raising the stan-
dard of material and training. This will
have the further effect of facilitating a re-
duction in the overall size of the ground
forces. The Nary and Arr Force will re-
main at their present personnel levels and
their performance capacrty will be en-
hanced commensurately rvith the develop-
ment of military technology.
( )The personnel strength of the Defence
Forces will be reduced by in all 110 000
over the planning period. Among the meas-
ures by means of which this will be ach-
ieved are a gradual phasing out from the
rvartime configuration of the most poorly-
equipped brigades. That will leave the De-
fence Forces with a wartime strength of
about 430 000 The wartrme forces will be
divided into Operational and Regional
forces.
The Operational Forces will enable de-
fence preparedness to be increased rapidly
and serve as the linchpin of the defence ef-
fort.
The Regional Forces wrll provide the
whole country with a defence shield. They
are rntended to perform combat and sup-
port tasks that are limited to a specific
" European Securitv and Finnish Defence, Report by
the Council of State to Parliament on 17 March
1 997; www.vn.h/vn/english/publicaV9703 1 7se.htm.
area or targel.They include a significant
proportron of the wartime forces"3a.
43. Accordrng to the proposals in the Govern-
ment's report, compulsory militaty service has
been reformed and the length of service spread
over three periods:
"the trarmng period for an officer, non-
commrssioned officer or those con-
scripts in specially demanding posts is
362 days;
- 
the service period for conscnpts trained
for work requrnng special skills is 270
days and forthe other rank and file 180
days.
More than 80% of the age group do their
military seryice"3t.
A review of the process for reforming the armed
forces is scheduled for 2001, to be followed by
an overall assessment of defence planning in
2005
(iii) Poland
44. Poland, which recently became a member
of NATO, started reforming its armed forces
some time back in preparation for its accession to
the Atlantic Alliance. Srmrlarly to other coun-
tries, it encountered internal, economic and pol-
itical obstacles. The preparations it is now mak-
rng in order to join the European Union, rvhich
include compliance wrth a number of stnct eco-
nomic criteria, limit its room for manoeuvre on
defence expenditure and the share that can be
spent on reforming the armed forces. Modernis-
ing infrastructure and equipment in order to bring
them up to NATO standards is takmg pnonty
over the armed forces' requirements in "human"
terms. Poland has nonetheless earmarked a com-
mendable proportion of its GDP for defence, the
figure rn 1998 beng2.2o/o36, placing it within the
average for NATO member states. However,
'o lbid.35 "Facts about the Frnnish Defence Forces 
- 
Con-
scription"; Finnish Ministqv of Defence; wltl,.vn.fi.
'u "NATO: implications of European integration for
Allies' defence spending"; page 11: United States
General Accounting Office. June 1999. The 1999
budget is lorver, standing at 2.03%o of GDP (Source:
Polish Ministry of Defence; wrvw.wp.mil.pl.)
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personnel costs account for over 60% ofexpendi-
ture.
45. The plan to reform the armed forces.
called "Armia 2012". envisages a reduction in
personnel from 230 000 (half of rvhom are con-
scripts) to 180 000 in 2004. One of the objec-
tives is to increase the number of volunteers un-
der contract3' to 6ooh, to reduce the number of
officers to 30%o and rncrease the number of
NCOs to 40o/o. The length of militan,service wr1l
be reduced to 12 months (from the present 18
months). As the Polish authorities recogruse:
'Not all the solutions for the model of fu-
ture armed forces hare been found yet.
The discussion is still in progress, and the
shape of the Polish Armed Forces of the
2lst century is emerging graduallv. Nu-
merous issues have been rnitiated 
- 
others,
for example the programme of technology
modernisation, are subject to the strict ng-
ours of the country s econom\r. The basis
for tlus process of transformation, x'hich
will take several \'ears, was Poland's firm
aspiration to become a NATO member
state, and its strategic arm is modern, rvell-
trained armed forces, ready to defend the
country and to act within the international
peacekeeping and peace-enforcing opera-
. ..49trons ".
46. The present structure for military service
is as follows:
''Liability to compulsory national militarl'
seryice applies to Polish citizens, i.e. men
aged 18 to 50 (in the case of Warrant Of-
ficers and Commissioned Ranks. to the age
of 60) and women aged 18 to 40 who have
skills and/or qualifications useful in mili-
tary service (rn case of Warrant Officers
and Commissioned Ranks, to the age of
50)
( ) Primar.v military service lasts for 18
months (...).
CrvI defence pnmary service
Conscripts are called up and assigned to
civil defence primary service by the Chief
3? Currently for a penod of one to four years..
" Polish Defence Ministry; ''The Polish armed
forces" urrv.*p. mil.p1.
of the Recruitment Board. The service
lasts for 18 months.
Univer.trty and colle ge graduate s'
mtlttary training
This form of service prepares officer re-
serves. It lasts two or six months.
Res erve s s erv cemen tromtng
This form of service is based on the par-
ticipation of the reseryes in military exer-
cises.
While in the reserves, a reservist can take
part rn exercises for a maximum period of
18 months.
Replacement service
Conscnpts who do not uish to adjoum
their militarv servlce but profess religious
rules and moral pnnciples contradictory to
those in the military can apply for a re-
placement service in public utrlrt_l' estab-
hshments. The service lasts for 24 months.
Vo I unlary mr h la ry se rvi ce
Men aged under 25, who have completed
their pnmaw military service, are eligible
for voluntary service. The service lasts one
to four vears.
Career mthtary service
A career servlceman of the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Poland can be exclu-
sivell' a Polish citizen rvho possesses ap-
propriate qualifications and phvsical and
psychological capabilities for professional
milrtarl' sen,ice. Career servicemen consti-
tute three fundamental corps: career offi-
cers, Warrant Officers and NCOs. Re-
cruitment takes place on the basis of vol-
untar), enlistment. There are two forms of
career service.
Career servtce on a permanent baxs per-
formed, first of all, by career officers lvho
have completed their course of studies at
appropnate military education establish-
ments.
Career servce on a temporary basts per-
formed by career officers rvho wrsh to
practise their profession for a certain pe-
riod of time, u,ho obtaur from colleges or
t4
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universities qualifications useful in the
military, and who undergo military train-
mg. A contract is drawn up for a mrnimum
penod of five )'ears: however, a contract
with the same person can be signed three
times at the most (r.e. for a penod of 15
I'ears)"3e.
47. Poland's endeavours to reform its armed
forces are geared to achieving a modem force
ready to face the challenges of the next century.
Hou'ever, the vanous economic pnorities and the
choices to be made as regards channelling avail-
able resources are bound to slow this process
down. it is therefore important for Poland's allies
in NATO, for the Alliance itself and for the
European Union, which is to have its own secu-
nty and defence polic-v-, to provide it rvrth advice
and assistance. Poland's frontiers today are also
those of the Alliance, and tomorrorv thel' rvill be
those of the European Uruon. A period of uncer-
tainlv is beginning in eastem Europe and its con-
sequences will determine the future of European
secuntl'. Modern armed forces for Poland are an
additional guarantee ofsecurity for our continent.
2. Developments in professional armedforces
(a) Belgium
48. The law of 31 December 1992 amendmg
the coordinated larvs on the militia abolished
compulsory mrlitary service. Over a period of
five years, from 1993 to 1998, the strength ofthe
army 
- 
the main component of the Belgian armed
forces 
- 
dropped by 50% and today there are
Z7 500 soldiers (half of whom are officers and
NCOs). Women account for some 7%o of thelotal
and have access to every tlpe of rveapon. Con-
tracts are signed for two-year penods rvith the
possibility' of three one-year extensions. Reserv-
ists are divided into three categories: thev are
assigned to a specific unit, to temtorial defence
duties or have no particular assignment. There is
no compulsory call-up of reservists in peacetime.
49. Despite being ferv in number, Belgian
troops are lughll' active in operations abroad
camed out under the auspices of the United Na-
tions or NATO. However, srnce the tragic events
in Rrvanda in Apnl 1994,the Belgian presence in
Africa has been scaled down considerably.
Commrtments in Croatia and Bosnia and Herze-
govina have mobilised a large number of troops
and lmrted their availabilit-v outside Europe for
long penods. An insufficient number of recruits 
-
a problem that rvill in the longer term also affect
other countries rvluch opt for professional armed
forces 
- 
has an impact on the number of troops
Belgium is able to deploy.
(b) The Netherlands
50. In 1993 the Netherlands Government de-
crded to abolish compulsory military service wrth
effect from 1 January 1997. Horvever, this meas-
ure makes provrslon for recourse to conscription
in a crisis situation deemed to be a sufficiently
serious threat to the country's secunty. The
"Framervork Memorandum for the 2000 Defence
Wlute Paper", u'hich the Ministry of Defence
made public rn March 1999, provides a detailed
description of the objectives to be attained for the
Netherlands' new armed forces and aptly draws
attention to recruitment issues and the need for a
young and qualified force.
51. The memorandum, containing 'principles
and guidelines for the Defence Wlute Paper"to,
will form the basis for making up the armed
forces. It defines three essential mrssions for
those forces whose total strength is set at ap-
proximately 70 000 troops in 2000:
"(a) defence of national and NATO terri-
tory against a 
- 
for the foreseeable future
limited military threat and defence
against a multrtude of security nsks of
various tlpes;
(b) protection and promotion of the inter-
national rule of larv;
(c) sttpport and assistance, both national
for the execution of civilian govemment
tasks and international in the event of dis-
aster-relief and peace-building missions".
Wrth a view to carrf ing out these missions, the
restructunng process curently under rvay is fo-
cusing on five objectives: "combat readiness,
deptoyabilrtl', flexibility, mobility and interna-
tional rnteroperability for units".
52. The memorandum contains advanced
thinking on the future of European defence and
ao For a summary of the Framework Memorandum,
consult the Netherlands MoD site on www.mindef.nl.
" Ibid.
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asks relevant questions about the direction to be
taken. The introduction states that: "In the exe-
cution of therr main tasks, the Dutch armed
forces will alwa1,s act as part of an international
alliance of forces. Our country provides modules
which are integrated into alarger rvhole consist-
rng of contributions from other countnes. It is
desirable to rmprove coordinatron of the efforts
of the Allies. In the long term, there could also be
some kind of specialisation ( .). Better coordi-
nation and specialisation could lead to more re-
sponsrble choices in major investments in equrp-
ment (. ) The situation calls for intensifrrng
international consultation about the coordination
of defence efforts and about the possibilities for
the distribution of tasks". The authors of the
memorandum also consider that: ''the difference
betrveen operatrng under Article 5 of the NATO
Treaty and operating in cnsis-management op-
erations on the borders or near the treatl area is
fadrng".
53. On the subject of reform of the armed
forces, u'luch have been professional since i997,
particular attention is pard to questions of re-
cruitment and human resotrrces management.
The approach taken is very pragmatic and the
memorandum establishes a link between recruit-
ment and the state of the economy and the em-
ployment market by pointing out that: ''Qualified
and highly motivated personnel are vital to good
defence policl'. The defence organisation has to
vie xith strong competitors on the employment
market. In order to succeed, the defence organi-
sation must be open to developments in the soci-
et_v of rvhich it forms part, without losrng sight of
the special charactenstics of the armed forces.
This is all the more important because the sus-
pension of the obligation to enlist has resulted in
far feu'er Dutch people havrng personal erperi-
ence ofthe armed forces than used to be the case.
Although the armed forces' nght to exist is not
under discussion, thev must focus attention on
the position thev hold in socieh that helps prop
up the defence organisation. Furthermore, broad
social support benefits the image of the defence
organisation, ufiich in turn is rmportant for its
position on the employ.rnent market".
(c) The United Kingdom
54. The United Kingdom's armed forces went
professional in 1960 and can be held up as a
model for other countries wishing to go dorm the
same road. The wars rn the Falkland Islands
(i982), the Gulf (1991) and former Yugoslavia
(1991-99) shorved the British forces' capaciw to
deploy both troops and equrpment despite the
fact that they had a permanent contingent of
troops on duty rn Northern Ireland. And 1'et, in
lvars involving a "coalition" of forces, the Uruted
Kingdom has aln'avs been able to make a signifi-
cant contnbution in terms of both qualit-v and
quartlty
55. The system also owes its success to cul-
tural and social factors as the regiments that
make up the armed forces are actively involved in
the day-to-day life of the towns and regions
where they are based and senrce in such units is
sometimes a family tradition. The armed forces
also use modern marketing methods for recruit-
ment that are rn tune with changes rn society.
Their effectiveness in crisis situations helps to
marntarn their prestige and reputation among the
civilian population, which is an asset for recruit-
ment purposes.
56. The ambitious prograrnme of reform of the
armed forces pubhshed bl, the Government on
8 July 1998 confirms the prioritl,given to force
projection over conventional temtorial defence
tasks. Chapter 5 of the Strategic Defence Review
(SDR) which concerns the future shape of British
forces states that: "In t}te cold war, rve needed
large forces at home and on the continent to de-
fend against the constant threat of massive at[ack
from an enemy coming to us. Now, the need is
increasinglv to help prevent or shape crises fur-
ther away and, if necessary, to deploy mrlitary
forces rapidly before thel' get out of hand. Most
force projection operations of tlus kind are likely
to be multrnational'(r.
57 . Chapter 6 of the SDR contains a detailed
discussion of recruitment and personnel man-
agement issues and points to some shortcomrngs
that may have negative consequences for imple-
menting the reforms:
"We also expect a lot in skills 
- 
defence is
a highly professional, increasingly high
technologl', vocation We must therefore
recruit lughi , motivated people. We must
rnvest in their training. We must retain
them and maintain their motivation. To do
a1 Strategic Defence Review; Chapter 5. The future
shape of our forces; 8 July 1998: wuu'mod.uk.
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this we must equip them properly for the
tasks we give them. We must also ensure
that our demands on them and their famr-
lies do not become unreasonable ( .)
We must also deal with the underlying
problems of undermanmng and overstretch
that we have inherited. Thrs is essential to
maintain the professionalism for ufuch our
forces are so widely admrred and, in par-
ticular, to pronde the highly responsive
forces we need for the new intemational
environment. This rvas emphasised by the
evidence from the Review's internal con-
sultation. Our people are looking to the
Review to set out a future for defence in
rvhich they can have confidence. A crucial
test will be rvhether we can solve these
problems (...).
Overstretch and undermanning are linked
problems. Overstretch is trying to do too
much with too little manpower. One result
is that units and individuals 
- 
especially rn
key areas 
- 
are separated from their fami-
lies too often and for too long. Another re-
sult is that preparation for other tasks and
longer term training suffer.
Undermanning 
- 
that is when units are not
up to planned strengths 
- 
is one of the
causes of overstretch. Individuals wrthin
undermanned units have to do more and,
particularll' for operations, individual rein-
forcements have to be brought in from
other units. Unsurprisingly, the addrtronal
pressures from persistent overstretch con-
tnbute to higher exit rates from the armed
forces thus adding to marulng drfficul-
ties."
58. This situation is similar to the one urth
rn'hich the American armed forces have been
grapplrng for some years. Accordng to TTT
Europe, a French news bulletin, "in summer
1999 the armed forces were still understaffed by
9 000 men, slightly up on the Apnl figure. Tlus
figure includes a requirement, also up, for 612
officers, a situation which is still unsatisfactory( ) In fact many officers are choosing to leave
the forces between the ages of 28 and 36 (...)"0'.
59. To improve the situation in the United
Kingdom, which is a significant factor if the re-
forms are to succeed, the SDR considers that:
'We need to restore intakes to a level which
meets our long-term needs. This is a challenging
task but recent trends are encouraging. We need
to recruit high-quallw adaptable people in a rap-
idly changing society. We will be puuing addi-
tional emphasis on recruiting and adapting our
approach to better reach all sections of the com-
munity. We are particularll, antous to recruit
more from the ethruc minonties and more
women, whose potential rve have not firlly tap-
ped (... ) we need to take positive action to make
the Services more attractive as a career. For most
people the Services cannot be their only career. It
is therefore vital that we provide them with
transferable qualifications for return to a civil
society which does not at present sufficiently
recogruse the high skills and real responsibihty
acquired in the Services".
60. The SDR was drawn up on the basis of the
principle that "In the post-cold war world we
must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than
having the crisis come to us. Capabilities and
equipment will be modemrsed to provide higtly
flexible, well-equipped forces able to project
power very rapidly to potential troublespots and
crises"o3. To achieve these objectives, the focus is
berng put on force projection capabilities and
support, with measures including an increase in
the number of Ro1'al Naly and Royal Air Force
reservists and more manpower for the Regular
Army accompanied by a significant reduction in
the Temtorial Army whose numbers are to go
down from 57 000 to 40 000. Tlus is a model
army u'hich wrll serve as a example for other
countries moving over to the system of profes-
sional armed forces but wfuch, contrary to the
Netherlands approach, is designed to marntain
present levels of performance in all three serv-
ices: the arrny', na\y and air force. While the
Brrtrsh reforms will also require a major financial
effort, they have to fit rn with the general down-
u'ard trend affecting European defence budgets
o' Press notice and key points of the Strategic De-
fence Review; www.mod.uk.o' TTIJ Errope, No. 286, 9 September 1999.
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and it is planned to cut defence spending by 3%
rn real terms by 200244.
III. The rsszes involved in
pr ofes sion al ar med for ces
61. Force projection would appear to be one of
the main arguments for a general move to pro-
fessional armed forces. An awareness of the need
for preventive action as opposed to the cold-war
postue of playing a warting game is now domi-
nating considerations in headquarters all over
Europe and is behrnd the reforms under way. The
slow convergence of national interests towards
common decisions in foreign, secunty and de-
fence policy is a factor that encourages dre idea
of systems being ahgned on those models which
would appear to be the most effective for hard-
ling present-day crises. Even in countries which
have retained compulsory military service, a de-
bate is going on between the advocates and op-
ponents of professional armed forces and it is
highly likely that the coming years will see more
changes.
62. Going over to a professional system is not
srmply a technical procedure designed to make
the armed forces more effective; it is also a sociai
choice. Once compulsory military service is abol-
ished, some sectors of societ_v are bound to lose
touch with the military world and in the long run
this will make it more difficult to reintroduce
even hmited conscription if the need were to
arise. Decisions as to whether to srvitch to pro-
fessional armed forces also give nse to a debate
on what can be called a "defence culture" in so-
ciety. Where this exists, the link between the
armed forces and civilians can be maintained and
developed in a positive manner.
63. Efforts to promote the image of the armed
forces are also important, in particular to attract
the younger generation. In recruitment campaigns
in the United States, the United Krngdom or
France, for rnstance, greater emphasis is increas-
ingly being placed on technology, especially
computer technologl', which is more likely to
attract a section of the public used to playrng
video games and surfing the lnternet. Humanitar-
44 For 1999/2000 the UK defence budget is f21730
million (at corstant prices). 11200112002 it is estim-
ated that defence spending will account for f2l 555
million (at constant pnces); www.mod.uk.
ian operations are another aspect given promi-
nence as they have a positive rating m society.
64. In the case of the vast maJonty of EU
member states, military service with a view to
internal and external security is seen as an obli-
gation that people generally put up with but
uluch is increasingll.being challenged. Being a
conscientious objector is the most obvious way in
wfuch to do this but young people also resort to
other means to avoid mrlitary service. An exlen-
sion of the duration of a young person's studies,
which often goes hand in hand with a deferment
of service, also restricts the extent to which the
armed forces can integrate with society and ends
in discnmination between the various sectors of
the population. Given the level of technical ex-
pertise required for the use of certarn items of
equipment and of modern computer and commu-
nications technologies, the effectiveness of the
armed forces suffers where there they do not
have enough qualified personnel. Tomorrow's
armres will be more mobile but they wrll also
depend on technology and its application for
military operations.
1. Trends in defence perceptions
65. In the year 2000 about half the military in
NATO and EU countries will be full-time pro-
fessionals or wrll be in the process of moving in
that direction. The other half is geared to mrxed
systems which wrll probably lead in practice to a
bias for mainly volunteer systems around 2005
followed by a move to fully professional armed
forces as soon as the domestic political context
allows. This trend is also the result of changes in
national defence perceptions in which the priority
given to teritorial defence is gradually berng
replaced by active intervention in crises abroad
or outside the framework of militarv or economic
alliances.
66. Since the Gulf war. which falls into the
category of conventional military intervention in
response to one state attackrng another, humam-
tarian motives have become the main reason for
taking action in what are for the most part inter-
nal conflicts. The "right of humanitarian inter-
vention" is a concept that appeals to public
opinion especially as, in most NATO and EU
countries, there are no conflict situations likely to
provoke armed action on the part of a third party.
In sprte of all the activism in this area, humani-
tanan intervention is still bound up wrth national
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foreign policy considerations from which eco-
nomic interests are not excluded. The difference
between Kosovo and East Timor is indicative of
thrs state of affarrs. ln the first case there was a
readiness to destabilise the FRY fty resorting to
mrlitary action and an economic and political
embargo) rn order to make Kosovo an autono-
mous region while in ttre second, the proposal
made was for dialogue and economic aid to Indo-
nesia if it agreed to the presence of UN forces on
territory which the United Nations itself has al-
ways maintained did not belong to that country.
(a) New missionsfo,r the armedforces
67. The Petersberg Declarationos adopted by
the WEU Council of Ministers on 19 June 1992
defines three types of mission in which forces of
WEU member countries could be engaged:
"humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping tasks;
tasks of combat forces in cnsis man-
agement, including peacemaking".
At the time, intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan, So-
malia and former Yugoslavia had a strong impact
rn the media wluch impressed public opinion and
the governments became actively rvolved in such
efforts. Seven I'ears on, in 1999, NATO finally
decided to carry out "Petersberg missions" itself
by setlrng up IFOR (1995-97) and SFOR (since
1997) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by
KFOR (srnce June 1999) in Kosovo. Operation
Alba in Albania was the result of an ad hoc co'
alition created at the initiative of Italy which was
havrng to contend with a massive influx of Alba-
man refugees (who were also looking to immigrate).
68. All these operations highlighted the limits
of many European armed forces in terms of force
projection and, even in cases where they were
deployed, ground support over an indefinite per-
iod in a muitinational context in which interop-
erability was a long w'ay off being achieved.
Among the countries involved in these operations
the United Kingdom stood out for its rapid force
deplolment capabilities in terms of numbers and
performance. The idea that professional armed
forces and projection go together therefore gained
currency and provided arguments for those in
favour of this model.
(b ) Pr ofe s si on al arme d for c e s an d for c e pr oj e cti on
69. Betlveen the war in the Gulf and Kosovo,
a large part of the military operations conducted
in the 1990s were "out of area", in other words
oulside NATO's tradrtional sphere of influence
or areas bordering on states of the European
Union or WEU. Tlus therefore meant that head-
quarters had to organise force deployments well
away from their national base camps in countries
bordering on those rvhere crises had occurred.
Forces projection served to point up the differ-
ences between professional armies, or those with
units of professional soldiers, and traditional
conscnpt armies.
70. This lent weight to the idea that profes-
sional armies are better suited to efficient force
projection than either conscnpt armies or those
with a mixed system. The realrty is more compli
cated. It is largely for reasons ofa political rather
than just a military order that mass conscription
has recently gone out of fashion. It is also a
matter of how the national interest is viewed.
Post 1945, European colonial wars were waged
by armies with a high proportion of conscripts,
as was the Vieuram war. In the late 1980s, when
the tensions of the cold war had subsided, West-
ern democracies sigruficantly reduced the length
of military service. Numbers in service remained
high but traimng periods were shorter and the
number of tours of duty went up, thereby reduc-
ing overall efficiency 
- 
u.rth the exception of a
few specral unrts or forces traditionally made up of
professionals (such as the French Foreign t€gro")
71. When the crisis broke out in the Gulf and
the United States called on its allies to rally
round, the vast majority of European members of
NATO were unable in practice to field sigrufi-
cant numbers of men and weapons. Only the
United Kingdom and France were in a position to
make a substantial contribution in those areas. It
was not only combat units that were involved.
Permanent support was required, tn coordination
u.ith other forces operating by different methods
and using different equipment. The lessons drawn
from the Gulf war speeded up the move towards
professional armed forces in a number of states,
rvhile others began to give serious thought to
projection needs and forces packages that would
result in an improved out-of-area presence. With
the advent of the crises in former Yugoslavia and
Albania, this approach was taken further.a5 See Assembly Document 1322, 29 June 1992
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72. Notwrthstanding geographrc proximity and
the existence of well-developed communications
and transport netrvorks (by air, overland and by
sea) between former Yugoslavia and the rest of
Europe, fielding armed contingents, both rr the
IFOR and SFOR framernorks, or that of Opera-
tion Alba (rn Albania) or KIO\ represented a
major effort in terms of selectrng units, equrp-
ment, means of transport and accommodation.
The large numbers of troops deploy.ed (40 000
for IFOR in 1995, 20 000 for SFOR n 1977,
8 000 for Operation Alba in 1997 arrd nearly
50 000 for KFOR in 1999) put additional strain
and pressure on national defence forces, includ-
ing professional armies. Field tours of duty of
four to six months on average, the need for
stand-rns owing to planned departures, missions
of indefinite duration, installation, maintenance
and equipment replacement requirements all con-
stituted further calls on alreadv tight or limited
defence budgets, delayrng planned reforms.
73. The deployment of forces for humanitarian
operations is transforming the armed forces rnto
"firemen" who are called in every time the media
spread news of a crisis or conflict. The concem
to 'keep up appearances" seems to be prevailing
over foreign, security or defence policy consid-
erations, the argument of the need for "main-
tarning the credibility of NATO"a6 to justifl' the
intervention in Kosovo being one example. Once
they are on the spot, depending on the political
objectives set for their mission, troops find them-
selves engaged rn policing and reconstruction
activities, and sometimes in mediatrng between
the different parties to the conflict, pendrng the
establishment of appropriate civilian structures.
The duration of mrssions and use of forces for
civilian tasks give rise to new problems, such as
the flagging morale of the troops and stress on
the part of servicemen kept far from their homes
and families, in some cases leadrng to the early
departure of experienced soldiers and officers.
74. However, the lessons learned from these
recent crises showed the edge a professional
army has when it comes to force projection. The
fact of being able to assemble large numbers of
unrts rvithrn a short space of trme and deploy
them at long distances from base is a not incon-
siderable advantage when it comes to managing
ou US and NATO objectives and interests in Kosovo;
US State Departmenq 26 March 1999, wwrv.state. gov.
late twentieth century crises. Nevertheless, in
multinational operations, the difFering status of
forces is a handrcap to rapid response. While
some countries can deploy large contingents
quickly, others have to form units from a mix of
professional toops and conscripts mth the atten-
dant constraints this entarls for operational effi-
ciency and domestic policy. These are parameters
wluch states that still retain mixed systems must
take into account in their planning process if they
are resolved to make a significant contribution to
European cnsis management in the years to
come.
(c) The growing importance of reserves
75. The move towards professional armies
means a reduction in the numbers under arms,
which in turn has implications for reserve forces.
The gradual disappearance of conscription even
if it subsists in the legislation in the event of an
emergenct means fewer people jormng the ranks
of the resewes. The ageing of the population also
affects their numbers and a want of proper su-
pervision and regular training is leading to a fal-
ling-off in their efficiency. Developments in so-
ciety, the assimilation of the traditional nation
state in a wider European whole a:rd the absence
of any identifiable territorial threat are calhng
into question the pnnciples on which national
defence was traditionalll'based until the end of
the cold lvar, rvhich served to justift the mainte-
nance of substantial reserve forces.
76. Once the emphasis switches to force pro-
jection and the management of crises in Europe
or elsewhere, and defence spending stagnates or
declines, it becomes clear that the admimstratron
ofa large pool ofreserves, part ofthe inhentance
of conscription, is a complicated issue which de-
serves to be discussed in a separate report. Re-
seryes still have an important, if not central role
to play in national defence today and in European
defence tomoro\,. First, the fact that they are
there means that thel,can rapidly be drafted in as
backup, freeing up resources for the front line.
Then, once the situation on the ground is stable,
their skills can be used to supplement traditional
militar,' functions, for example, restoring govern-
ment services, reconstruction work or assisting
the civilian population, until other players
(NGOs and international organisatrons) are able
to take over. Reserves are thus an essential op-
erational fallback to forces on active service.
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77. The rvhole issue of reserves is closely con-
nected wrth the future of the armed forces in
Europe and most countries have plans for mod-
ernisation. In those countries moving in the di-
rection of professional armed forces, specific
legislation is in preparation to protect reserves
from the effect of a substantral drop in enlistment
numbers brought about by the ending of compul-
sory military service. In a professional armed
forces context, reserve forces provide a lrtk be-
tw,een the military and civil sociew, rvhere previ-
ously it was essentially conscnption wluch ful-
filled that function. The nerv forces paradigm. in
rvhich forces are fewer in number and geared to
deployment abroad, is increasingly dependent on
reseryes for carrl'rng out missions, and requires a
nerv kind of rnteraction betrveen the armed forces
and the mder society, and in particular the world
of business. An example in point is that of the
creation in the United Kingdom in the 1990s of
the National Emplolment Liaison Committee
(NELC) whrch brings together heads of industrl',
opinion formers and seruor politicai and military
figures to consider the problems industry would
face as a result of the mobilisation of reserves
u.hen required. This initiative needs to be taken
into account by European states u'hich have cho-
sen to move towards professional armed forces,
in order to avord damaging economic activity.
2. The issuesfor Ll/estern societies
78. The move towards professional armed
forces in Europe is the result of an evolution in
national perceptions of defence, budgetary con-
stramts and the development of civilian society.
The latter aspect is very important in terms of
plans to move to$'ards professional armed forces
in the future. Modern societies are consumer and
leisure societies and societies based on communi-
cations networks. National educational systems
are increasingly attempturg to reflect the diversitl'
of views, values and cultures present in their
countries and countries are themselves becoming
more regionalised. In such a context, traditional
defence cultures and military values for the most
part seem to younger generations like svmbols of
bygone eras now passing into dim and distant
memory.
79. From society's perspective, compulsory
military service provides better guarantees of
social cohesion bl,providing physical and moral
training for the younger generatlon and giving
them a sense of national belonging. However-
although European armed forces, up until the
1950s, were "peoples' armies" composed mainly
of voung people from rural areas or the ivorking
classes and commanded b1' officers from the up-
per-middle and upper echelons of society, the
situation changed drastically in the 1970s. Nolv,
in those countries which still have conscnption,
most of the conscnpts come from middle class
families in urban areas. with a reasonably satis-
factorl' standard of living:
"In the future the great majonty of young
people wrll live ( ) as big consumers of
the entertainment industry's products and
media. Individual-centred values wrll
strengthen and the [armed forces] will
have to contend increasingly with (...)
competition"a'.
80. The longer penods spent on studies, the
possibility of doing communit-v sewrce rn local
authonties, associations or state-run servlces
(such as the police) as an alternative to rrulitary
service and the short duration of compulsory
military service have all reduced the relative im-
portance of the armed forces as a factor for urte-
gration and education and their role as a social
'melting-pot". Moreover, social change has gen-
erated new demalds as regards representation
(unions, freedom of opinion and expression) and
conditions of service (more flexrble trarning,
various forms of religious and psychological
support, more comfort and convenience in terms
of facilities and equipment). Armed forces,
whether composed of conscripts or professional
soldiers, are evolvrng wrth society.
81. A professional armed forces system can
also af[ect national cohesion in European coun-
tries such as Italy, Spain and 
- 
rn a slightly dif-
ferent way 
- 
France. in which regions are intn-
cately bound up u,ith the administrative system.
In the longer term, the armed forces could be
more representative of a region than the nation as
a whole and this would have consequences for
their ties with civil societl'. However, the model
of the British armed forces is a good one in this
respect in that thel'have English, Welsh, Scottish
and Northem Irish regrments. But this whole
o' European Security and Finnish Defence: Report by
the Council of State to Parliament on 17 March
1 997; wwrv.vn.fih,n/english/publicat/9703 17se.htm.
2l
DOCLMENT 1669
problem is concerned nrth hrstorical factors in
individual countries and their regions and the
relations betrveen regions and central authonties.
The differences in economic and social develop-
ment between regions and their respective polvers
all have a bigger rmpact on national cohesion
than the actual changeover from compulsory mil-
itary service to a professional s]'stem. Such a
system must be allowed to run for a few 1'ears
before that impact can be measured, given that
national cohesion is already having to contend
with the consequences of the increasing degree of
inter-regional cooperation within the European
Union.
82. Economic cnteria also plal' a key role rn
this process and it has to be said 
- 
notwithstand-
ing all the talk about increasing (or reducing)
budgets 
- 
that defence is not an immediate prior-
rty. Civrl societl"s demands are directed rather
towards social welfare, education, emplo\ment,
internal secunty' and economic stability and
growth. The introduction of the euro is forcrng
states to keep control oftheir budgets and, under
present geostrategic circumstances, defence is not
perceived as a nsing star on the horizona8.
83. The evolution of civil socielv and a greater
awareness of ethnic and cultural drversity have
also led to new situations for uhich the armed
forces were not necessarill, prepared. Opening up
military service to women and persuadlng )'oung
people from etlrric minorifi, groups to enlist, to-
gether with the issues raised by the "coming out"
of sexual minonties have created new challenges
over and above that of the move towards profes-
sional armed forces. Professional armies like
those of the Unrted States and the United King-
dom are increasrngly encountering situations of
this nature that requrre sensitive handling and
also lead to tensions in the relationship betrveen
the political authorities and the mrlitary estab-
lishmentae.
o' In 7997198, the uK defence budget ar 2.'7%o was
almost the same as the home affairs budget at z.lyo
of GDP (1%" and 502 respectively of the nation's
budget); SDR, rwr,v.mod.uk.
o' The European Court of Human Rights recently
ruled against the United Kingdom for discriminating
against homosexuals m the British armed forces.
(a) Rationalisation in the professional armedforces
84. Reforms of Europe's armed forces are also
prompted and dictated by ongoing financial con-
straints x'hich carurot all be lumped together as
part of the peace dividend. The CFE and CFE-
1A accords on disarmament and limitation of
conventional armed forces set ceilings and limits
on manpower and equipment to take account of
geopolitical and geostrategic changes resulting
from the ending of the cold war. Horvever, the
trend towards lower defence budgets, takrng ac-
count of their evolution as compared x,rth other
economic indicators such as GDP, goes back to
the 1960s and 1970s. As the economies of Eur-
ope grew stronger and the European CommuruN
rras transformed into an economic porver, the
reform of industrial and financial structures to
meet the challenges of world economic compet-
itron absorbed a large part ofnations' budgets.
85. The easing of tensions in Europe rern-
forced that trend and defence postures became
the object ofreform rn a drive to achieve greater
efficiency' and savings. Some states decrded to
strengthen operational capabilrt_v while marntain-
ing the principle of compulsory military service
intact, others decided to move towards fully'pro-
fessronal armed forces. Both cases reflect a de-
sire to achieve savings and hold defence budgets
down wrthin well-defined limits. The growing
cost of equipment also has to be taken into ac-
count by better procurement in terms of im-
proved qualitl' and much reduced quantitv. As a
result- large numbers of military personnel are
becoming redundant and keeping them in jobs
could damage overall efficiencv. The turn-over of
conscnpts also involves shorter tramrng and drill
periods.
86. This "rationalisation" of the armed forces
thus seems to reflect the dominant economrc para-
drgm in its search for greater productirrt_v through
the use of nerv technology, whrch requires fewer
but better-qualified staff. Taken together rvrth the
trend tou,ards force projection, the move towards
professional armed forces offers a credible solu-
tion for maintainrng an effective defence posture
increasinglv geared towards external operations.
In an economic context such as the present u,here
the euro imposes a strict budgetary drsciplne, the
professional option gives governments greater
flexibrliq, rn managing their armed forces, *'hose
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slze can be more easily adjusted to the political
and financial dictates of a particular set of cir-
cumstances.
87. This being the case, the savrngs achieved
b1,the move to\\'ards professional armed forces
are relative as compared uith conscnption or
mixed systems. The absence of conscript forces
has to be compensated, as far as certain func-
tions go, by recourse to external civilian person-
nel at market prices. Wages, training and the
various benefits intended to encourage people to
enlist (health. training, pensions, famrly allorv-
ances and so on) cost more than for conscnpts.
Where economies are expanding and jobs being
generatcd, the level of such inducements is cru-
cial in preventing mrlitary staff with good skills
from defecting to the pnvate sector.
88. If compulsory military service is abol-
ished, so is the community service offered as an
alternative to conscientious objectors or done b1'
other recmits who so desire. Conscripts rvorking
for the local authorities or social services, in both
the public and private sectors, fulfil a social
function at low cost for the duration of their
service. Without that pool of conscripts to draw
on, ferver of those community tasks ur1l be per-
formed, because their costs will increase and
perhaps even become diffrcult to afford for some
employers (local authoriues and associations, for
example).
89. While the debate on applying convergence
criteria to defence rvould seem to offer a logical
solution to the budgetary problems, it does not
appear to be in tune with the economic realities
of the momenl. Without a European defence
policy and a greater rationahsation of armaments
procurement and production, the benefits of a
budget increase would be limited to the national
level. The lorv economic growfh rates in Euro-
pean countries and uncertainty as to how the euro
will perform during its teething period (rvhich
should end in 2002-2003) leave no scope for im-
provisation in this area. According to a report
issued by the United States General Accounting
Offrce on 'NATO 
- 
the implications of Euro-
pean rntegration for Allies' defence spendrng":
"The link between increased economic
gro\rth and countries' defence budgets is,
of course, an indirect one. In general,
stronger growth leads to more resources
for all spending needs. including defence,
and rvealier grouth can squeeze manv
budgetary categories. Horvever, changes in
the level of defence spending over time
solel1' due to changes in economic growth
can be relatively small. For example,
holding assumptions about mrlitary threat
and political support for defence spending
constant, if GDP growth increased (de-
creased) b1' 1 percentage point per year
relative to baselure projections, it rvould
take about five vears for real defense
spending to increase (decrease) by 5o/o"s0.
(b) The role of women and minorities
in today's armed forces
90 The ending of compulsory mrlitarv servtce
with its concomitant reduction in staff numbers
raises the diffrculty of how to guarantee suffi-
cient levels of recruitment and employment with-
rn the forces in peacetime. One option has been
to open the armed forces to women and another
increasingly' to look to ways of recruiting volun-
teers from mrnonty groups rvithin society.
Modern societv tends to be open-minded on such
issues and professional armed forces must there-
fore expect to fall in u,ith the new trend which
involves special nghts, usually enshnned by law,
being granted to specific groups in society.
91. Clearly, the ending of compulsory military
service under rvhat are still fatrly stable and en-
couragrng economic circumstances will create re-
cruitment difliculties, particularlv among the
middle ranks of sociefi'. Given ttre disciphnary
constraints that prevail rvithin the establishment
and the nsks involved in military action, salary
levels do not compare at all well rvrth the civilian
sector rvhen rt comes to attracting candidates
rvho are rvell-educated and professionally trarned.
To circumvent this difficulty, the armed forces
can develop ancillary trarning prografllmes, offer
opportunities for further study or set up links
rvith industry to find jobs for staff when dis-
charged. This is a practlce follorved by the US
armed forces and the issue is under constant re-
'o "NATO - the implications of European inte-
gration for Allies' defense spending", page 39
United States General Accounting Office, June 1999.
The average GDP growth of countries in the euro
zone is 2%o per annutn (OECD data) and the share of
GDP allocated to in NATO countries is 2%o ort
average (NATO data).
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vrew in European countries moving towards pro-
fessional armed forces.
92. It is clear, however, that wrthin the Euro-
pean Union frameu'ork, investment in youth em-
ployrnent and the present access to higher educa-
tion and professional trarning limit the attractions
of mrlitarl. service as a tool of economic and so-
cial integration. The section of the population
hkely to be most attracted by a career in the
armed forces is the one that tends to be excluded
from the benefits such programmes offer and it is
in that segment of the population that large num-
bers of citizens belonging to minonty groups rn
society are to be found.
(i) ll/omen in the armedforces
93. An increase in the number of rvomen in the
ranks of the armed forces is hkely to be one ma-jor result of the move towards professional
armed forces The issue was discussed, in the
contexl of change wrthin the armed forces, in a
Defence Commitree report in 199151. Its tenor
was that the successfrrl fulfilment of the tasks
facing the armed forces, rn peacetime and in time
of crisis and rvar, requires a high degree of pro-
fessional competence, continuit), and expenence.
The armed services are competing in an expand-
ing labour market, recruiting more and more
women.
94. From a social pornt of vierv, it u'ould also
be of interest to examine the rvay rvomen inte-
grate into a professional body that retains a very
traditionallv masculine identrtl'. There is a need
to analyse the changes wrought by the growing
number of women on the wa1,of life and rvorlong
methods of the armed forces. Here, three obser-
vations can be made:
almost all European countries recruit
women rnto the armed forces and the
proportion is tendrng to increase;
enlisting women is now essential to en-
sule satisfactory levels of entry,
- 
the presence of both men and women in
the armed forces creates new situations
in terms of personnel management
uluch have implications for operational
capabilities.
51 "The role of rvomen in the armed
Assembly Document 1267, 13 May 1991.
95. The presence of rvomen in Europe's armed
forces is not a new phenomenon. Women soldiers
and officers have alu'ay,s been present in the
medical, support and administrative services, and
particularlv from the 1970s onrvards. However,
the rntegration of women into operatronal units
and their takrng up commands leads to reserva-
tions on the part of the mrhtarl' establishment.
This situation is tending to change with the move
towards professional armed forces and the re-
duction rn mrlitary staff numbers, while the pro-
portion of rvomen increases. In the Unrted States,
rvhere the trend to more female staff in the armed
forces is part and parcel of the increased eco-
nomic, social and political role of \\romen in so-
cielv, the presence of rvomen in combat units is
no longer exceptional even though their number
is as yet small. Restncted access to frontJine
units, however, leads to u'omen being concen-
trated in other services, particularly logistical
support.
96. Among the states that have decided to
adopt the professional system and those that al-
ready have one, the percentage of women is still
small and farrly constant: 7.2Yo for Belgium,
2.3%o for Spain, 7.5%o for France, 7.2o/o for the
Netherlands , I.loA for Porfugal md 7 .5o/o for the
United Kingdom. Italy u'aited until it had a fully
professional army before allowrng female volun-
teers to enlist, by passing a larv on 29 September
1999 committing it to that course. In the United
States, women make up 14.4% of armed forces
personnel52.
(ii) Minorities
97 . The ultrmate success of the move towards
professional armed forces depends on an opti-
mum resolution of the issue of assimilating mi-
nority'groups in order to maintain adequate levels
of recruitment. Selection of volunteers must take
more account of physical and intellectual abilitl,
than ethmc origin or education, although, clearly,
recruitment campaigns are directed primarily
towards better-qualified candidates, uho, be-
cause of their achievements at secondary school
or universrty or in technical fields, are able to
make better use of the new technological re-
sources norv available to the armed forces.
98. In theory compulsory mrlitary service
leads to reasonabll' falthful representation of the
forces",
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different components of society wrthin the armed
forces. The presence of minonties is relatively
eas)' to manage, at least in terms of numbers.
With a professional armv the situation is differ-
ent. It has to take the candrdates that come for-
lvard and cannot erect bamers to any given
group of the population. This is a new situation
for armres in the process of moving towards pro-
fessional status and the problems it raises are
also sigruficant from the point of view of military
efficiency.
99. The caricature of an American army con-
sisting mainly of hoards of Afro- and Hispano-
Americans has continued to imprint itself on the
European mind since the Vietnam war. ln point
of fact, the percentage of those groups in the
armed forces is pretty'u'ell in line with that in the
US population in general. Hence rn 1997, the
composition of the US armed services was 64%o
white, 19% Afro-Americans, 9% Hispanics and
6%o other mrnonty origin. Among the civrhan
population witlun the same age band (18-2a) the
percentages u'ere 660/r,l4yo, ).4.5Yo and 5o%'3. In
all the armed forces taken together, the percent-
ages were respectively 20o , 7o/o and 6o%. Horv-
ever, for the army alone, Afro-Americans repre-
sented 30% of personnelso.
100. There is no reason to suppose that minor-
rty recruitment in Europe wrll be any different,
though the problem remains of managrng an eth-
nic minority presence rn an establishment whose
main purpose is not necessarily to bring about
integration 
- 
this being rather the role ofthe edu-
cational system and antldiscrimination and equal
emplol,rnent policy. The armed forces must,
however, seek to avoid situations that smack of
racism or harassment, as far as minority groups
within their mrdst are concemed. The United
Kingdom has formulated a policy of integration
that might be an example worth considering for
countries rvho are rn a transitional phase oftheir
move towards professional armed forces.
101. The Arm]' Equal Opporrunities Policy,
brought out from under wraps on 13 October
1998, rvas summed up as follows b1' General Sir
" 
"Fixing what arn't broke 
- 
The renewed call for
conscription"; Cato Institute, Poliry analysis No.
35 1: 3 I August 1999: wur,r'.cato.org.
sa Minorities rn unrform (hgures at 31 December
1 9 9 8) ; w-urv. defenselink.mil.
Roger Wheeler, LIK Army Chief of Staffs: "In
the Army we are determrned to provide genuine
equalrt_v of opportunrty for everyone irrespective
of their sex, marital status, race. ethnic origin,
colour or religious belief. Army policv is crystal
clear: drscrimination, harassment and bullytng
mll not be tolerated". This policy is based on
five principles:
"treating everyone fairly and wrthout
prejudrce;
keeping the Army free from any form
of discrimrnation, includrng harass-
ment, victimisation and bullylrg;
understanding what is expected of us in
terms of duty, performance, standards
and behaviour;
focusing on the individual's abilities;
removing barriers '*'hich impact more
harshly on people of certarn racial
groups or ofone sex"56.
102. The launch of this initiative was followed
by a recrurtrnent campaign directed towards mi-
nont-v groups wrth the twofold aim of aclueving
the requrred annual level of recruitment (around
16 000 army recruits) and "the arm of reflecting
society' s diversity". Particular consideration was
given to religious differences and associated
practices and provision is made to the effect that,
within an operational framework, "every effort
will be made to secure a dispensation from the
relevant religious authority (...)" t-th regard to
dietary requirements or rehgious practices. Cer-
tain exemptions as regards dress are also al-
lowed:
"In the Army, Sikhs can wear turbans and
are also permitted to wear the five K's:
Kara (steel bangle), Kesh (uncut hair),
Kanga (small comb), Kaccha (special-de-
sign kneeJength underpants) and Ki.pa,
(small sword). Horvever, under certain op-
erational circumstances, during training
for operations and in some specialisations
thev will be required to wear operational
or protective headgear. Examples are com-
bat helmets and flying helmets. This can
be achieved by rvearing a patka under the
55 "Equal opportunities" ; \r'r!'r\'. arny. mod. uk.
- - lDtA.
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operational headgear. In addition, rvhere
there is a high nsk of Nuclear, Biologrcal
or Chemical (NBC) rvarfare, the wearing
of a resprator is vital for survival. To pro-
vide an effective seal a smooth facial sur-
face is essential and the beard (part of
Kesh) rvill have to be shaved to the point
rvhere an effective seal is achieved. ln
trarning, horvever, although personnel uill
be required to perform the drills for wear-
ing respirators, they' will not be requrred to
shave their beard".
There are also simrlar provisions as regards diet,
dependrng on religious practice.
103. One sensitive issue that remails to be re-
solved is that of sexual minorities, a controver-
sial subject both rn the United States and in
Europe. The introduction of anti-discrimination
laws and the possibilrty of recourse to such legis-
lation to obtain justice through thc national or
European courts is likely to give rise to situations
that are difficult to handle uithrn an armed forces
setting and betn'een the mrlitary and civilian
authonties. The recent ruling against the United
Kingdom by the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg on 27 September 1999 is an
example of such developments and the precedent
thereby created could u,ell be used by other
countries5T.
IV Conclusions
h ofession al arme d for c es
and building defence Europe
104. Withrn the gamut of reform of European
defence forces, or those of Western European
countries at least, the move tou'ards professional
armed forces seems the logical conclusion to the
t' Four RAF of[rcers brought a case before the
European Court of Human Rights arguing that their
dismissal from the UK Royal Air Force rvas based
solely on the consideration that they u,ere homo-
sexuals and that this represented a I'iolation of
Articles 8 and 1-1 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. In the ruhng it handed dorm on 27
September 1999, the European Court of Human
Rights stated that the UK Government had not gir.en
solid and coruincing reasons to justif-v its polict'
against homosexuals in the army and, as a result, the
subsequent drsmissal of the plaintiffs. Thus it took
the vieu' that a violation of Articles 8 and i4 of the
Convention had taken place.
adjustments rn defence policies in response to the
post-cold war geostrategic situation lnternal
economic constramts have also rnfluenced this
process and maintaimng conscription or mixed
armed forces arrangements x'rli become increas-
rnglv compiicated to manage rf the trend torvards
lou'er defence budgets is maintarned. The ageing
of Western societres, changes in the rvav people
iive and the impact of ne*' production and com-
munications technologies arid methods, the as-
simrlation of tradrtional nation states n srder
economic and political groupings 
- 
integrated to
a greater or lesser degree 
- 
make nelv approaches
to defence necessan'.
105. Traditronal border defence tends no longer
to be in the hands of the mrlrtan, estabhshment
urd is increasrngly, the responsibilrt_v of police
forces operating ever more ficquentlv in a Euro-
pean framervork (Schengen or Europol. for ex-
ample). Invasion is a notion that noq' applies
almost uniquelv to immigrants and asylum seek-
ers. rvhereas organised crime and traffrcllng rn
drugs, arns or people have reached a pitch r,vhere
thet' represent serious threats to national, re-
gional and international securi6'
106. Controlling proliferation of nuciear.
chemical or con'entional arms rs becomilg a
mrlitarv concern et,en though legal. diplomatrc
and economic instruments extst to cope s'rth such
threats. Humanitanan inten,entions are giving
wav to full-bloun lvarfare, compiete rvith surgi-
cal stnkes and collateral damage, as a means to
enforce human rights compliance. Thus armed
forces' missions are hence becommg more com-
plex, less transparent and give rise to a vanetr, of
interpretations. One individual might enhst for
humarutarian opcrations. another to combat pro-
liferation. r,et others in order to find emplorment.
continue qrth their studies or to feel more
secureh' a parl of socieh.
107. The various national defence authonties
are secking to justlfi, their existcnce uithin this
range of possibrlitrcs. The notion of force projec-
tion domrnates current thinking but in r icrv of the
present number of crises, horv long rvill rt be be-
fore theory is tested in practice? Nearlr' 60 000
NATO troops are currentlv engagcd in Bosnia
and in Kosovo. the majoritv of them from Euro-
pean statcs of u'hich onh, a handful can drarv on
professronal unrts. At the same time. the focus of
drscussion is on the equipment that must be pro-
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cured to guarantee more effective intervention in
future crises, without overdependence on the
United States. Wrth equipment prices rising, it is
again likely that the human element will be sac-
nficed, and sooner or later the question wrll arise
as to who is to go rn and occupy the terrain and
protect civilian populations under threat. For this
task what are needed are soldiers, trained men
and women, equipped for the mrssion they are
assigned and able to rely on adequate backup.
108. Europe has fewer laser-guided bombs,
fern'er Cruise missiles and fewer satellites than
other powers but, overall, it has a human poten-
tial that constitutes its strength. The turning point
in the war in Bosnia was the deployment of
French and British ground troops with tanks and
artillery, ready for action on the ground. The ar-
rival in Rwanda of French troops restricted the
scale of the humanitarian disaster; without the
presence of European forces on the Kosovo bor-
ders, negotiations over a cessation of hostilities
and the deparrure of Serb forces would have been
more difficult still, if not impossible. The crucial
factor in those developments was not the profes-
sionalism of the forces so much as the political
will to deploy them.
109. Herein lies the key to enabling WEU and
the European Umon take action in crises affect-
ing their vital interests or those of their members.
The German Army, still a conscript force al-
though now moving towards a mixed system,
u'as deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo. There are
also volunteer conscripts in both the Italian and
French forces in the region and tlus has not
raised any particular difficulty in political or op-
erational terms. Simrlarly, in both of those crises,
reservations over the deployment of American
troops and barriers (of a domestic policy order)
show that whether armed forces are professional
or not does not have a drrect influence on
whether they can be used abroad.
110. ln the debate on European defence, com-
pulsory national service and the move towards
professional status are techmcal issues. Between
the fully professional model and mixed systems,
Europeans have a substantial pool of forces,
suitable in qualrty and number for force projec-
tion. The gradual reduction in numbers in both
professional and conscnpt armies means that,
increasingly, multinational cooperation is neces-
sary. The audit of forces currently rn progress in
WEU is an important step rn that direction and
has to be supplemented by action taken jointly rn
relatron to equipment and interoperability. The
setting-up of an independent European headquar-
ters either rn NATO or seconded therefrom, tn
the service of the European Union, and the crea-
tion of a European chain of command and con-
trol, stem from strategic choices much more im-
portant to the future of European defence than
the type of force (fuIly professional, conscript or
a mixrure of both) available.
I 11. On this front, the prime consideration is
political will. Up until now, reforms of the armed
forces have been based on national, economic,
social and mrlitary considerations, with a degree
of lip service paid to multinational operations,
force projection and the new geostrategic envi-
ronment. However, the faa is that there is no
longer one single European state that can alone
deal rvith the many challenges that now exist in
secunty and defence terrns. The gradual conver-
gence of defence postures, the introduction of a
degree of task-shanng, the pooling of resources
and capabilities (transport and intelligence, for
example) are essential for a coherent and effi-
cient European defence.
112. Within such developments the armed
forces deserve particular attention in terms of
personnel and equipment, and governments
should be careful not to transform them into
laboratones for social engrneering to the detri-
ment of their principal function 
- 
which is com-
bat and preparation for war. ln the world as it
now is, in a state of flux, it is the men and
women in the armed forces, be they professional
or conscript, who represent the last vestiges of
national identity in societies where the trend to-
wards uniformit"v of economic policy, lifestyle,
communication and mass culture is becoming
ever more pronounced, through the process now
universally known as globalisation.
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